Recent Medicare legislation seeks to improve patient care quality by financially penalizing providers for hospital-acquired infections (HAIs). However, Medicare cannot directly monitor HAI rates, and instead relies on providers accurately self-reporting HAIs in claims to correctly assess penalties. Consequently, the incentives for providers to improve service quality may disappear if providers upcode, i.e., mis-report HAIs (possibly unintentionally) in a manner that increases reimbursement or avoids financial penalties. Identifying upcoding in claims data is challenging due to unobservable confounders (e.g., patient risk). We leverage statelevel variations in adverse event reporting regulations and instrumental variables to discover contradictions in HAI and present-on-admission (POA) infection reporting rates that are strongly suggestive of upcoding.
Introduction
The United States is one of the highest per-capita healthcare spenders in the world, surpassing annual expenditures of $2.5 trillion (Schoen 2013 , Martin 2012 ). Yet, there are serious concerns about the quality of care, particularly due to the prevalence of medical errors (Green 2012) . Recent Medicare legislation has aimed to improve patient outcomes and reduce costs through the gradual introduction of pay-for-performance policies, which create financial penalties for providers based on quality of care. In principle, these penalties would incentivize providers to modify their operations and improve their quality of service. Since Medicare cannot directly monitor patient outcomes, payfor-performance policies rely on providers self-reporting accurate information in order to correctly assess penalties. However, this information asymmetry creates financial incentives for providers to 2 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. upcode, i.e., bias their claims (possibly unintentionally) towards collecting greater reimbursement (Silverman and Skinner 2004) . Prior literature on contract design (Fuloria and Zenios 2001) suggests that such distortion of reported information may cause pay-for-performance contracts to fail since they reduce providers' incentives to improve quality of care. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such upcoding may occur frequently in practice (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 2015) .
In this paper, we empirically study upcoding in response to Medicare's efforts at reducing hospital-acquired infection (HAI) rates, as well as its economic and policy implications.
Background. HAIs are infections developed by patients as a consequence of medical treatment in a hospital. On any given day, 1 in 25 hospital patients in the US suffers at least one HAI, causing an estimated 75,000 hospital patient deaths a year (Magill 2014) . The Centers for Disease Prevention and Control estimate the direct economic cost of HAIs to be between $28 to $34 billion annually (Scott 2009 ). Evidence has shown that most HAIs are preventable through the use of better clinical practices (Berenholtz 2004 , Berriel-Cass 2006 . However, until recently, Medicare's fee-for-service model reimbursed healthcare providers for these infections regardless of whether or not they were due to an avoidable lapse in the provider's quality of care. Furthermore, Hsu (2014) found that providers could increase their margins over eight-fold for a given ICU patient if he or she incurred a HAI, since the patient would require an extended stay and more services. Thus, providers did not appear to have any financial incentives to prevent HAI incidence. This issue was addressed by the Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the hospital-acquired condition (HAC) nonpayment policy (starting on October 1, 2008), which aimed in part to incentivize providers to invest in reducing HAI incidence (a subset of HACs) by placing the financial burden of treating HAIs on the provider rather than on Medicare. The policy targeted selected high cost and high volume HAIs that were considered to be reasonably preventable through better healthcare practices. When providers submitted reimbursement claims diagnosing patients with one or more of these infections, they could indicate whether the infection was present-onadmission (POA) or not. An infection qualifies as POA if the provider detected it within a certain time window of the patient's hospital admission; we will refer to this as a POA time window, which is typically 48 hours (Meddings et al. 2010) . If the infection was not POA, it was deemed a preventable HAI and would not be reimbursed, causing a large financial loss to the provider for the resulting treatment (CMS 2014) . Furthermore, CMS began publicly reporting provider-specific risk-adjusted HAI rates on Hospital Compare in order to create added reputational incentives and to help route patients to higher-quality providers.
Unfortunately, multiple sources of evidence suggest that the HAC nonpayment policy has had little impact on the true rate of HAIs (Lee 2012 , Schuller et al. 2014 . It has been hypothesized that this may be because the financial impact of the policy was too small to influence significant Author: Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. 3 change in practice (McNair et al. 2009 ). Consequently, public organizations that promote patient safety have called for stronger financial penalties (see, e.g., Health Watch USA 2011). In response, further Medicare legislation was issued in the form of the HAC Reduction Program, which created additional financial penalties (starting on October 1, 2014) for providers with high HAI incidence.
Upcoding. We investigate another explanation for the lack of improvement in HAI incidence:
upcoding (inaccurate claims reporting that results in higher reimbursement or reduced penalties) may have diminished providers' financial incentives for reducing true HAI rates. In this paper, we focus on two types of upcoding that can occur when encountering a patient with a true HAI:
1. POA over-reporting, i.e., reporting a HAI as a present-on-admission (POA) infection, and 2. HAI under-reporting, i.e., failing to report a HAI.
Even though both types of erroneous reporting can be considered upcoding, we distinguish them in our analysis as they likely occur through different mechanisms and have different policy implications. Our principal objective of this paper is to assess whether reliable evidence can be found for the existence of either type of upcoding. Presently, there is mixed evidence for whether HAI upcoding exists. One study manually reviewed eighty medical records from the University of Michigan Health System and found that both types of upcoding were rampant:
"CA-UTI (the most common type of hospital-acquired infection) are rarely identified in [claims data]... In addition, coders often listed [infections] as present on admission, although the medical record indicated that it was hospital acquired... Because coding ... seems to be fraught with error, nonpayment according to CMS policy may not reliably occur." - Meddings et al. (2010) On the other hand, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a manual review of a few hundred medical records across the nation and found that HAIs were indeed reliably reported and that there was very little evidence of upcoding (Snow 2012) . These conflicting results illustrate the drawbacks of identifying upcoding through manual auditing of claims data: manual review is a time-consuming and expensive process that produces high-variance results due to small sample sizes and the rarity of HAIs. Yet, detecting upcoding from available observational data (i.e., hospital claims records) is challenging because a patient's true diagnosis is unobservable. Moreover, standard econometric techniques such as difference-in-difference estimates of reporting rates before and after the nonpayment policy do not apply because the distinction between HAIs and POAs in claims reporting did not exist prior to the nonpayment policy.
It is important to gauge the extent of upcoding at a national scale in order to better understand its implications for Medicare policy and for providers. In particular, significant upcoding (if present) can erode the effectiveness of the current regulation at reducing HAI incidence. Additionally, it raises questions about the veracity of self-reported HAI rates. This is especially concerning since financial penalties from the HAC Reduction Program are determined on the basis of self-reported data; thus, current policy may unfairly penalize providers who report HAIs accurately. Furthermore, Medicare publishes these self-reported HAI rates to inform patients so as to guide their choice of providers. Thus, upcoding could ultimately lead to the undesirable outcome of patients choosing low-quality providers who upcode over high-quality providers.
We note that there is a division of opinion on whether upcoding occurs intentionally or as a consequence of ineffective quality management. For example, Silverman and Skinner (2004) suggest that upcoding may be intentional profit-maximizing behavior, while Meddings et al. (2010) suggest that it may be a result of miscommunication between nurses and medical coders (specialized hospital staff who translate medical records to claims reports). We restrict the focus of our paper to finding evidence of upcoding rather than the question of intent. However, in §6.1, we discuss some insights derived from conversations with hospital quality control staff about our results.
Main Contributions. We use national claims reporting data to estimate the extent of upcoding after the nonpayment policy went into effect. Our identification strategy is driven by variations in existing state-level regulation on adverse event reporting, and we address endogeneity concerns through the use of instrumental variables. We find that the differential impact of state-level regulation on HAI and POA reporting rates is strongly suggestive of upcoding. In particular, under some mild assumptions, we find that providers in weakly-regulated states are either (1) over-reporting POAs, or (2) under-reporting HAIs relative to providers in strongly-regulated states. If we further assume that the omitted variable bias from unobservable patient risk in our empirical analysis is negligible, we can make the stronger claim that weakly-regulated providers over-report POAs. We strengthen the validity of this assumption by using an extensive set of patient risk controls (derived from patient claims histories and demographics) that have been validated in the medical literature.
In order to estimate the financial impact of upcoding, we make conservative estimates of the rate of upcoding in Medicare inpatient claims for the two most common and important infections -central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) and catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs) -that have been targeted by the HAC legislation. We estimate that there are over 10,000 over-reported POAs a year, resulting in an added annual cost burden of $200 million to Medicare for reimbursing these HAIs. While this cost inefficiency is small compared to other Medicare expenditures, it is important to note that this money was intended as a penalty to providers to incentivize them to reduce HAI incidence. The practice of upcoding has therefore eroded this financial incentive, thereby potentially reducing the effectiveness of the policy. Medicare's current plan to increase penalties through the HAC Reduction Program does not address these concerns, and may exacerbate the problem since providers with high HAI rates will face even greater financial pressure to engage in upcoding. Moreover, providers who are trying to report more accurately than others will be unfairly penalized, both financially and reputationally.
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Our results suggest that in order for HAI reduction policies to be effective and fair, federal regulation must be introduced to induce accurate reporting. To this end, we provide two policy recommendations: (1) targeted audits based on a new measure we introduce for identifying potentially upcoding providers, and (2) federal implementation of certain features of current state-level regulations that we find to be effective at eliciting truthful reporting. More broadly, we emphasize the importance of ensuring the veracity of self-reported data as Medicare moves towards adopting a growing number of data-driven pay-for-performance policies (HHS 2015) .
Related Literature. Our work relates to the literature on incentivizing provision of high-quality service under asymmetric information. This is typically modeled as a principal-agent problem (Bolton and Dewatripont 2004) . In healthcare, Medicare (principal) does not directly observe the provider's (agent) chosen action (level of service quality), making it difficult to design contracts that improve quality of care. For example, Fuloria and Zenios (2001) develop an optimal outcomesbased reimbursement contract for healthcare providers; however, they acknowledge that the new contract can only achieve significant gains in quality of care if the payer has access to accurate information about patient characteristics. In fact, they show that if providers distort reported information, outcomes-based contracts can perform worse than standard payment models.
Providers have several levers through which they can strategically take advantage of asymmetric information. One well-studied example is that hospitals may strategically choose which patients they admit. For instance, KC and Terwiesch (2011) find empirical evidence that specialized hospitals cherry-pick easy-to-treat patients. Similarly, Ata et al. (2013) show how the current hospice reimbursement policy may cause providers to engage in adverse selection by preferentially admitting short-lived patients. Brown et al. (2014) empirically find that Medicare overpays capitation payments to private Medicare Advantage plans due to risk-selection by private insurers despite recent efforts to employ patient-level risk-adjustment in deciding payment levels. In these papers, providers take advantage of Medicare's (relative) lack of knowledge of patient risk. In our work, we illustrate that providers (possibly unintentionally) take advantage of Medicare's lack of knowledge about the infection by upcoding, either through poor infection detection or inaccurate claims.
The issue of strategically maintaining poor detection of low service quality (or detection of infections in our setting) has been studied in the supply chain management literature, particularly with respect to social and environmental responsibility (Baiman et al. 2000) . The closest work is by Plambeck and Taylor (2015) who study how increased auditing pressure may motivate suppliers to exert greater effort to pass the buyer's audit by hiding information, instead of exerting care to improving quality and safety. Similarly, in our setting, increased financial penalties may incentivize providers to strategically maintain low detection levels of HAIs to avoid liability and penalties.
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Previous studies in the medical and economics literature have studied a different form of upcoding where providers report higher-paying diagnoses under Medicare's traditional fee-for-service system. Silverman and Skinner (2004) found that for-profit hospitals in particular bias their claims reports towards higher-paying diagnoses (DRGs) in order to maximize reimbursement; however, this form of upcoding has greatly declined after increased auditing pressure from Medicare. In fact, Heese et al. (2015) finds that recently, upcoding occurs more frequently among non-profit providers since Medicare preferentially avoids auditing them; based on these results, the authors hypothesize that Medicare allows "beneficient" non-profit hospitals to make some profit from upcoding in order to recover losses from other factors (e.g., treating poorer patients). From a methodological standpoint, both these papers use a provider's fraction of claims that correspond to the highest-paying DRG as a proxy for that provider's level of upcoding. However, a key limitation of this proxy (acknowledged by the authors) is that it can be biased by patient selection based on unobservable risk factors (e.g., as suggested by empirical work in KC and Terwiesch (2011) ). This issue was resolved by a large-scale manual review of medical records conducted by the OIG, which definitively established evidence for upcoding (Silverman and Skinner 2004) . Similarly, two studies took this manual approach for evaluating the extent of HAI upcoding, but as mentioned earlier, they yielded conflicting estimates (Meddings et al. 2010 , Snow 2012 ). This may be because such studies involve hiring costly medical experts and are thus limited to small sample sizes, leading to high-variance estimates. Our approach uses large-scale observational claims data and helps resolve this conflict by finding evidence of HAI upcoding as well as conservative estimates of its magnitude. In contrast to prior methodologies, we account for patients' unobservable risk factors using a double regression. We note that concurrent work by Geruso and Layton (2015) also uses observational data to study yet a different form of upcoding by private insurers among Medicare Advantage patients. However, their approach relies on comparing risk scores of patient populations under different insurers, which cannot be used to identify upcoding within the traditional Medicare population (since all patients have the same insurer). Thus, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to show and quantify upcoding behavior among Medicare fee-for-service patients using observational data.
Model of Claims Reporting
Claims reporting is an error-prone process and mis-reporting can occur through a variety of mechanisms. We provide a model of claims reporting to disentangle upcoding from other mis-reporting.
Preliminaries
A naive approach would use claims data to flag providers with relatively high POA reporting rates (suggestive of over-reporting POAs) and/or relatively low HAI reporting rates (suggestive of under-reporting HAIs). We may also risk-adjust these rates to account for variations in infection susceptibility among patients. However, these effects may also be caused by variations in:
1. Provider quality: higher-quality providers are likely to cause fewer HAIs and would thus report lower (risk-adjusted) HAI rates. However, these providers are not under-reporting HAIs.
2. Provider's POA infection detection: providers who successfully detect more POAs (by finding the infection within the POA time window) would report higher (risk-adjusted) POA rates. Analogously, they may report relatively lower (risk-adjusted) HAI rates since providers with poor POA detection may incorrectly identify POAs as HAIs. However, these providers are not upcoding.
3. Unobservable patient risk : if we fail to properly risk-adjust for infection susceptibility, providers with relatively riskier patients will appear to report higher (risk-adjusted) POA rates and providers with less risky patients will appear to report lower (risk-adjusted) HAI rates. However, these providers are not upcoding.
We address these concerns by exploiting variations in existing state-level adverse event regulation. Prior to the federal nonpayment policy in 2008, many states passed laws that mandated the reporting of various HAIs in order to track HAI incidence across providers. As documented by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services, regulations on the contents of these reports varied significantly from state to state (Levinson 2008) , thereby creating a natural quasi-experiment. A subset of states included measures to ensure accurate reporting (e.g., detailed patient and event information monitoring and root cause analysis). We will refer to this subset of states as strongly-regulated and all other states as weakly-regulated. Details on the nature of the regulation and our identification strategy will be presented in §3.
Model
Accurate reporting signifies reporting a POA in the case of a true POA infection, and similarly reporting a HAI in the case of a true HAI. Medicare policy requires that all detected infections be reported. Providers can deviate from accurate reporting by upcoding (claiming more reimbursement than allowed) and downcoding (claiming less reimbursement than allowed). We describe these mechanisms conditional on a patient's infection type.
Model parameters are defined for providers in strongly-regulated states (denoted by superscript S); analogous definitions hold for providers in weakly-regulated states (denoted by superscript W ).
Reporting Mechanisms. For a true POA infection, strongly-regulated providers report:
• a HAI with probability S 1 (downcoding) • no infection with probability S 2 (downcoding) • a POA with probability 1 − S 1 − S 2 (accurate reporting) Note that failing to report a POA accurately is considered downcoding since it likely decreases the provider's reimbursement. Downcoding occurs if the hospital fails to detect the infection within the POA time window (thus, forcing it to report the infection as a HAI), fails to detect it entirely, or fails to communicate the early detection or existence of the infection to the medical claims coder. Table 1 Summary of model parameters. The superscripts R ∈ {S, W } denote strong vs weak regulation.
Similarly, for a true HAI infection, strongly-regulated providers report:
• a POA with probability δ S 1 (upcoding via POA over-reporting) • no infection with probability δ S 2 (upcoding via HAI under-reporting)
• a HAI with probability 1 − δ S 1 − δ S 2 (accurate reporting) Both upcoding mechanisms may be a consequence of poor provider quality: POA over-reporting may be due to poor coder training, and HAI under-reporting may be due to poor infection detection ability. Of course, both mechanisms may also occur through intentional claims manipulation.
See Table 1 for a summary of parameters. Note that we only model cases where the patient truly has an infection (POA or HAI). Providers do not appear to report infections if the patient did not have an infection (Snow 2012 , Meddings et al. 2010 ).
Infection Risk. Let X denote the patient's observed risk covariates. Denote p S (X) as the patient's risk-adjusted probability of a true infection outside the hospital (i.e., the probability of a POA infection conditioned on X) in strongly-regulated states. (We omit the X-dependence when it is clear from context.) Note that this quantity does not depend on hospital-specific factors (such as quality or detection ability). Thus, if our patient-level risk-adjustment is unbiased (i.e., if there is no omitted variable bias), then p S (X) = p W (X); however, we will not assume that this is the case as there are many unobservable patient risk factors in healthcare that can create bias.
Next, let α S · p S (X) denote the patient's risk-adjusted probability of a true HAI (i.e., the probability of a HAI conditioned on X) in strongly-regulated states. Intuitively, p S (X) captures the patient's propensity for infection (which is the same as for POAs) and α S captures the impact of the hospital's quality of care on the patient's risk for infection. In other words, we assume that the overall risk for a true HAI is multiplicative in patient and provider risk factors.
We note that transferred patients may present a potential concern. In particular, patients may acquire infections at an outpatient facility. Subsequent admission to an inpatient provider may cause increased POA rates, which is reflective of poor outpatient quality rather than high patient risk. We perform a robustness check where transferred patients are omitted in Appendix E.
Reporting Rates. Given the model above, the observed per-visit probabilities of POA and HAI reports in strongly-regulated providers are, respectively,
Author: Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. Analogous expressions hold for weakly-regulated providers. We observe r R P OA , r R HAI for R ∈ {S, W } in claims data. Our goal is to identify if upcoding occurs, i.e., if δ R 1 + δ R 2 > 0 for some subset of states R. However, such an inference cannot be made directly from the observed claims rates since α (provider quality), 1 , 2 (provider capacity for POA infection detection), and X (patient risk)
are not fully observed. These quantities formalize potential confounders discussed earlier in §2.1.
Identification Strategy
As mentioned in §2.1, strongly-regulated states were required to have patient safety agencies that tracked HAI incidence across providers in their states (Levinson 2008) . They also included measures to ensure accurate reporting of these infections (see §4.2 for details). This state-level regulation was independent of Medicare legislation and, unlike Medicare policies, had no outcomes-based financial incentives. However, states could conduct on-site audits and exact financial penalties if providers were caught purposefully mis-reporting. Strongly-regulated states in particular required provider accountability for accurate HAI reporting as well as implementation of follow-up corrective strategies; thus, the regulations indirectly mandated that providers in such states had to improve their operational capabilities to correctly detect and prevent these targeted infections. As such, we may expect that providers in strongly-regulated states have (1) higher quality with respect to HAI prevention, and (2) better POA infection detection. We provide extensive empirical evidence from a variety of sources (see §3.1 and §3.2) to support these observations; going forward, these observations form our two key assumptions on the nature of providers in strongly-regulated states.
Consequently, we may expect providers in strongly-regulated states to report relatively more POAs (since they have better POA detection) and fewer HAIs (since they have better HAI prevention). Yet, claims data indicates that providers in strongly-regulated states have lower (riskadjusted) POA reporting rates and higher (risk-adjusted) HAI reporting rates (see Fig. 1 
, which
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shows unadjusted reporting rates in a random sample of ∼ 1 million Medicare inpatient stays from 2009-10). We argue that this result implies upcoding among providers in weakly-regulated states.
As discussed in §2.1, there are three potential sources of unobserved bias in claims reporting: (i) provider quality α, (ii) POA infection detection 1 , 2 , and (iii) patient risk X. First, note that unobserved variations in (provider quality and POA infection detection do not explain the trends in Fig. 1 , since strongly-regulated providers have higher provider quality and better POA infection detection. On the other hand, unobservable patient risk factors could account for one of the two trends, but not both. For instance, suppose that weakly-regulated providers treat relatively riskier patients (who are more susceptible to infections); then, these patients would have higher infection incidence, making it plausible that weakly-regulated providers would report higher POA rates.
However, the distinction between POAs and HAIs is merely the time at which the infection was contracted. Thus, if patients treated by weakly-regulated providers are relatively more susceptible to this infection, then we would expect these patients to contract more HAIs as well (this is supported by our observation that weakly-regulated providers have equal or lower quality of care with respect to HAI incidence). Yet, this claim is at odds with the empirical observation that weakly-regulated providers report relatively lower HAI rates. Analogously, suppose that weaklyregulated providers treat relatively less risky patients; this may explain why they report lower HAI rates, but then we would expect weakly-regulated providers to report lower POA rates as well (this is supported by our observation that weakly-regulated providers have equal or worse POA detection). Yet, this claim is at odds with the empirical observation that weakly-regulated providers report higher POA rates. This key observation allows us to identify upcoding behavior, which we will formalize in a hypothesis test in §3.3.
In the next two subsections, we characterize and justify the two claims we made earlier on provider quality ( §3.1) and infection detection ( §3.2) in the language of our model.
Assumption on Provider Quality
Our first assumption is that providers in strongly-regulated states have equal or better quality with respect to HAI prevention. We compare a variety of risk-adjusted provider quality metrics reported on Hospital Compare (December 2010 release), including mortality rates and process of care measures. We find overwhelming evidence that strongly-regulated providers offer better care.
Mortality. We compare risk-adjusted mortality rates between providers in strongly-and weaklyregulated states (Table 2) . During this time period, Medicare reported these rates only for three conditions: heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. Using a t-test, we find that providers in strongly-regulated states have lower risk-adjusted mortality rates across all 3 conditions with high statistical significance. In Appendix C.2, we verify that a similar relationship holds for our instrumental variables and the instrumented treatment variable (Table 12) . Table 2 T-test results are shown comparing Medicare providers' risk-adjusted mortality rates in strongly vs.
weakly regulated states for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia patients.
Process of Care. We compare all 26 reported (risk-adjusted) process of care quality measures that relate to adult inpatients (Table 3) ; similar results hold for outpatient metrics (Table 15 in Appendix E). We find that strongly-regulated providers outperform weakly-regulated providers on all but one measure (where the difference is not statistically significant). The improvement in performance is statistically significant for 75% of the measures. We particularly draw attention to measures related to the appropriate administration of antibiotics (PN 5c, PN 6, SCIP INF1, SCIP INF2, and SCIP INF3), which aids in infection prevention. Even more relevant, the measure SCIP INF9 captures the appropriate and timely removal of urinary catheters after surgery, which is critical for CAUTI prevention (Saint 2009 ). Strongly-regulated providers perform significantly better on these measures compared to weakly-regulated providers.
Finally, we note that our conversations with hospital staff also support the claim that stronglyregulated providers have established additional infrastructure for ensuring compliance with statelevel guidelines on HAI prevention (see §6.1). These results motivate the following assumption:
Assumption 1. We assume that strongly-regulated providers cause equal or fewer true HAIs compared to weakly-regulated providers given patients that are equally susceptible to infection (i.e., when fixing p). In other words, we assume α S ≤ α W .
Assumption on POA Infection Detection.
Our second assumption is that providers in strongly-regulated states report true POAs more accurately (i.e., they downcode less). We justify this claim by comparing time-sensitive process of care measures and adjusted payment rates reported on Hospital Compare, as well as our own measure of "billing aggressiveness" computed from claims data.
Nurse Staffing. The medical literature (see, e.g., Meddings et al. 2010 , Mark and Harless 2010 , Duffin 2014 ) and our conversations with hospital staff suggest that timely infection detection and attribution is a nurse-centric task. Unfortunately, evidence shows that US hospitals have severe nurse understaffing, e.g., 33% of surveyed nurses report inadequate staffing levels and half report insufficient time with patients (ANA 2016). Consequently, several states have introduced regulation to ensure adequate hospital nurse staffing levels. Using data from the American Nurses Association, Table 3 T-test results are shown comparing Medicare's risk-adjusted process of care quality measures in strongly vs. weakly regulated states for heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical care improvement.
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we find that the majority (75%) of strongly-regulated states (versus only 8% of weakly-regulated states) have adopted such regulation, suggesting that strongly-regulated states have improved nurse staffing levels and would thus have higher POA detection. However, since nurse staffing levels are not publicly reported in most states, we examine some alternate nurse-centric metrics below.
Time-sensitivity. We compare the subset of process of care measures (discussed earlier in §3.1)
that are time-sensitive. We focus on tasks that are required to be completed within a (short) prespecified time window; providers who successfully complete these tasks in a timely manner may be more successful at identifying true POAs by testing for the infection within the allowed POA time window (typically 48 hours). Time-sensitive process of care measures include: AMI 7a, AMI 8a, PN 5c, SCIP INF 1, SCIP INF 3, SCIP INF 9, and SCIP VTE 2 (Table 3) . We find that stronglyregulated providers outperform weakly-regulated providers in all these metrics, and the difference is statistically significant in over 70% of the measures. This suggests that strongly-regulated providers are more responsive and may be more successful at the time-sensitive task of identifying true POAs.
Billing Aggressiveness. Next, we examine provider billing behavior. Recall that POAs are reimbursable complications, and failing to report them accurately (downcoding) results in a loss of reimbursement. We may expect that providers who exhibit more aggressive billing practices may be better at detecting and reporting POAs accurately to avoid leaving money on the table.
To this end, we examine payment rates (adjusted for variations in demographic differences in pay, patient risk, and provider mortality rates) reported on Hospital Compare. Table 4 compares Medicare's "payment and value of care" metrics (adjusted for variations in demographic differences in pay, patient risk, and provider mortality rates) using the December 2015 release of Hospital Compare's risk-adjusted provider quality metrics; we note that payment information was not made available in Hospital Compare data during the study period . We find that strongly-regulated states receive much larger adjusted payments with high statistical significance;
this difference persists after we stratify providers by quality (i.e., we restrict the comparison to providers with risk-adjusted mortality rates that are comparable to the national average). This demonstrates that strongly-regulated providers are more successful at receiving higher payments for equal quality of services provided (despite accounting for demographic differences in pay).
We also define our own measure of "billing aggressiveness" (computed from claims data):
billing aggressiveness j = i∈T j charges to Medicare for inpatient stay i i∈T j
Medicare payment for inpatient stay i
where j is the index of the provider and T j is the set of all inpatient stays under the care of provider j. This heuristic -the ratio between total payment requested and total payment received -would likely be higher for aggressive providers who attempt to charge Medicare much more for each patient Table 4 The t-test results compare Medicare's adjusted payments to strongly vs. weakly-regulated providers for selected infections over both (i) all providers and (ii) providers with mortality rates comparable to the national average. The last row shows the ratio of adjusted payments to the national average for all Medicare patients. stay than the typical reimbursement level. Providers that code their claims more aggressively to achieve the highest possible reimbursement rates are likely to downcode less frequently. Note that billing aggressiveness is different from upcoding, since the codes may be accurate.
Using a t-test, we find that providers in strongly-regulated states have higher billing aggressiveness (mean: 4.42) compared to weakly-regulated states (mean: 4.10) with high statistical significance (p = 0.003). Thus, we find significant evidence that strongly-regulated providers are more aggressive in claims reporting, and furthermore, succeed at receiving higher payments for equal quality of services provided. This suggests that they are more likely to discover and report all reimbursable complications (including POA infections). Finally, our conversations with hospital staff also support the claim that strongly-regulated providers have established additional infrastructure for ensuring compliance with state-level guidelines on accurate HAI (and therefore, POA) detection and prevention (see discussion in §6.1). These results motivate our second assumption:
Assumption 2. We assume that strongly-regulated providers report true POAs more accurately (i.e., they downcode less). In particular,
Hypotheses
Let the rate of POA over-reporting (the risk-adjusted probability of a reported POA in the event of a true HAI) in strongly-regulated states be
; similarly, let the rate of HAI underreporting (the risk-adjusted probability of no reported infection in the event of a true HAI) be
Then, the total rate of mis-reported HAIs is O S + U S . Consider the following hypothesis:
Compared to strongly-regulated providers, weakly-regulated providers have higher rates of upcoding, either through (i) POA over-reporting or (ii) HAI mis-reporting.
We can write this as hypothesis H 1 (corresponding null hypothesis H 0 ): 
Proof of Proposition 1 : Assume H 1 is true. Then, r S P OA < r W P OA , so we have
using Assumption 2 ( 
By Proposition 1, if we empirically accept H 1 , we can conclude that weakly-regulated providers have higher rates of upcoding compared to strongly-regulated providers. In particular, weakly-regulated providers upcode regardless of whether strongly-regulated providers do so. Moreover, if our patient risk-adjustment is unbiased (i.e., p S = p W ), then we can further conclude that weakly-regulated providers over-report POAs by at least as much as their excess risk-adjusted POA reporting rate.
We use an extensive set of patient risk controls (see §4.4) to support the claim that p S = p W .
16
Potential Endogeneity of HAI Reporting Rates
One potential concern with our analysis is that state adverse event regulation may be endogenous to HAI reporting rates. Specifically, strongly-regulated states may have introduced adverse event reporting regulation as a response to low provider quality with respect to HAIs (although they have overall higher quality of care). In this case, it would be reasonable that providers in stronglyregulated states report relatively higher (risk-adjusted) HAI rates. We address this issue by using an instrumental variable approach: our instruments are various measures of state taxation levels (known as the Economic Freedom Index (Ashby et al. 2010) ) which are correlated with the strength of a state's regulatory environment but bear no direct relationship with HAI-specific provider quality (see §4.5). We find our results remain consistent despite accounting for this endogeneity.
Datasets
Summary statistics of selected variables can be found in Table 8 in Appendix A. Our unit of observation is an individual Medicare inpatient stay, and we perform a cross-sectional analysis on inpatient stays in 2009-10. We limit our sample to short stays 1 under the prospective payment system served by providers in the United States (which is the healthcare setting that was targeted by the nonpayment policy). Finally, if a patient is newly enrolled in Medicare (e.g., from
Medicare Advantage), their past visits may be censored (thus, creating bias in controls computed on past visits); we address this by limiting our sample to patients with at least one prior Medicare inpatient stay in the past 24 months. Details on our sample selection can be found in Appendix B.
Note that these filters affect all states uniformly, and therefore do not create bias in our analysis.
State Reporting System Classification. As of January 2008, 26 states had implemented adverse event reporting systems in the absence of federal guidelines. The OIG performed a detailed comparison of these systems based on telephone interviews with the staff responsible for each state's reporting system (Levinson 2008) . The OIG report describes key features of the state reporting systems, including the type of information that must be reported by each state regarding (1) the affected patient, (2) the adverse event, and (3) the root cause of the adverse event. All 26 states with reporting systems enforced at least reporting the identity of the hospital and the adverse event that had occurred. We reproduce the information reported in each category and the number of states that had implemented each requirement in Table 9 in Appendix A. 
Treatment Variable
One possible definition of the treatment variable is simply having an adverse event reporting system. Interestingly, our results show that merely having an adverse event reporting system does not have a significant effect on POA and HAI claims reporting rates for CLABSIs and CAUTIs (see discussion in §5.4). This is because the quality of the reporting systems varies widely. Instead, we look for states that impose meaningful requirements on the quality of reporting. We construct a treatment variable that is an indicator for whether the provider is located in a state that had strong regulations on adverse event reporting prior to the federal nonpayment policy in 2008.
As previously noted, we use data from an OIG report which lists each state's information reporting requirements ( §4.1). We are particularly interested in regulation that enforced accurate reporting. The OIG report claims that states identified cases of mis-reporting by "analyzing reported data, comparing hospital reports against complaints, referrals, and administrative databases, and conducting onsite audits" (Levinson 2008, pg. 4) .
These methods are greatly aided by the availability of more detailed data. In particular, we argue that the more data a state has regarding the circumstances of an adverse event, the harder it is for a provider to mis-report the event without being detected. Thus, we use the amount of required information reported to states in each category as a proxy for increased regulatory pressure for accurate reporting. For simplicity, we choose the most informative reporting requirement from each of the three information categories (see Table 9 in Appendix A), namely, We define our treatment variable based only on these three reporting requirements, which helps us better interpret our results and make concrete policy suggestions. Since there are many ways to define the treatment variable, we perform a robustness check ( §5.4) by considering several alternate definitions of the treatment variable to alleviate the concern that a particular definition of the treatment variable gave rise to our results by chance.
In order to construct the treatment variable, we compute a binary "strength" for each state's regulation of its adverse event reporting system based on the number of these three features adopted. The median number of features adopted among states with reporting systems was one;
thus, we consider the strongly-regulated states to be those with two or all three features. According to this definition, the strongly-regulated states are CT, FL, MA, MN, NJ, NY, RI, and SD. (We define a binary treatment variable to improve the interpretability of our results; in §5.5, we perform a robustness check to ensure our results are consistent if the treatment variable is continuous.)
Thus, we define the binary treatment variable S for providers as:
• S = 0: Provider is located in a weakly-regulated state, i.e., either had no adverse event reporting system, or had an adverse event reporting system that had zero or one of the three reporting requirements described above.
• S = 1: Provider is located in a strongly-regulated state, i.e., had an adverse event reporting system with two or all three reporting requirements described above.
Outcome Variables
We focus on CLABSIs and CAUTIs, the only two HAIs directly targeted by both the HAC nonpayment policy and the recent HAC Reduction Program. We define two outcome variables:
• P OA i is an indicator variable for whether either a CLABSI or a CAUTI was diagnosed along with the present-on-admission indicator in the claims record for inpatient stay i.
• HAI i is an indicator variable for whether either a CLABSI or a CAUTI was diagnosed without the present-on-admission indicator in the claims record for inpatient stay i.
Controls
We define a variety of controls to account for potential confounders.
Patient Risk. States that implement strong regulation for HAIs are likely to have also implemented other measures towards improving population health; this may, in turn, affect downstream patient infection rates. To account for this effect, we control for an extensive list of patient-specific factors that are computed from their claims histories. Age, sex, and race are obtained from Med-PAR's summarized beneficiary demographic information. We use a rolling window of 6 months of each patient's claims history to identify risk-associated quantities such as the number of days since the patient's last admission, the number of prior admissions, the number of prior procedures
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performed on the patient during those admissions, the number of previous CLABSI and/or CAUTI infections sustained during that time, and the total length of hospital stay days.
We also use 6-month patient history to compute the Charlson comorbidity index (measure of patient risk that predicts patient mortality within 6 months) and 29 Elixhauser comorbidities (scores that capture patient comorbidities outside of the primary reason for hospitalization). These measures have been frequently validated and are widely accepted in the medical community (Deyo et al. 1992 , Elixhauser et al. 1998 Billing Aggressiveness. This measure is a heuristic we defined earlier in §3.2; it attempts to capture a provider's propensity for claiming higher reimbursement for a patient. Note that aggressive billing is different from upcoding since the claims may be accurate, i.e., avoiding downcoding 3 .
Instrumental Variables
Our treatment variable is potentially endogenous if states with poor provider quality (with respect to HAIs) chose to pass adverse event reporting regulation. While strongly-regulated states have higher provider quality on many standard metrics (see §3.1), HAI-specific provider quality (the quantity of interest in this context) is unobservable. We address this issue through the use of instrumental variables. We focus on two factors that drive increased state-level regulation that are not caused by high HAI rates: (i) a state's capacity to issue and enforce costly regulation, and (ii) voters' preferences for increased regulation. Following the example of Mukamel (2012), we use the Economic Freedom Indices as our instruments (see Table 8 in Appendix A for summary statistics): Summarizing, strongly-regulated states have higher Area 1 index and lower Area 2 and 3 indices:
in particular, they are predisposed to stronger state-level government presence (Areas 2 and 3) and stronger financial resources to support regulation (Areas 1 and 2). We verify that these instruments are sufficiently correlated with the treatment variable through a weak identification test (see §5.2).
Second, we believe the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the HAI regression, i.e., the instruments are not predictive of reported HAI rates after conditioning on the treatment and controls. Unlike the original treatment variable, which may have been directly caused by poor provider quality with respect to HAIs, there is no apparent causal relationship between poor HAIspecific provider quality and our instruments. We perform an overidentification test ( §5.2), which suggests that the instruments are, in fact, not correlated with the error term in our regression.
Furthermore, our instruments capture state affluence; since affluent states have more financial resources to improve provider quality, we expect that the instrumented treatment variable would be positively correlated with HAI-specific provider quality. To support this hypothesis, we show that both the instruments and the instrumented treatment variable are positively correlated with higher provider quality on a number of standard quality metrics (see Appendix C.2, specifically Tables 12   and 13 ). Recall that our instrumental variable approach is motivated by the concern that the treatment variable may be correlated with (unobserved) poor HAI-specific provider quality, i.e., the error term of the HAI regression. Therefore, this hypothesis suggests that even if the instruments are correlated with the error term, we expect the correlation to be negative. As described in Appendix
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C.3, this ensures that our treatment effect estimates are conservative; i.e., the causal effect of the original treatment variable on HAI reporting rates can only be higher than our estimate.
Finally, we note that it is highly implausible that a state's decision to regulate was influenced by its POA rates, because adverse event reporting systems targeted HAIs and, to the best of our knowledge, there were no state agencies that even collected information on present-on-admission infection rates. Thus, we only use an instrumental variable approach for our analysis of HAI rates.
Estimation & Results
We perform treatment effect estimation to determine the causal effects of strong state-level adverse event reporting regulation on POA and HAI claims reporting rates for CLABSIs and CAUTIs.
Our primary analysis uses standard regression techniques under a linear probability model.
Although our outcomes are binary, we use a linear probability model (see Section 15.2 of Wooldridge (2010) for a justification) rather than a logit or probit model so that we can perform instrumental variable validity tests in the presence of clustered errors (e.g., see Cameron and Miller (2015)). We perform robustness checks in §5.5 to show that our results remain consistent under alternate specifications. We find that the presence of strong state regulation of adverse event reporting was associated with decreased POA rates and increased HAI rates. Finally, since we seek to jointly establish statistical significance for both POA and HAI regressions, we can conservatively apply the Bonferroni correction by summing the p-values for both regressions as our joint p-value.
We note that in all our regressions (including robustness checks), the sum of the two corresponding p-values is less than 0.05, showing that we have joint significance. As argued in §3, this suggests that providers in weakly-regulated states have statistically significant rates of upcoding.
POA Regression
Let S i be the treatment variable (as defined earlier), C i denote the vector of controls (including an intercept term) for inpatient stay i. We use a linear model with the econometric specification:
where i is the error term. The coefficient of interest is β
P OA S
, which represents the effect of strong state regulation on POA reporting rates. Specifically, if β P OA S is negative, this would indicate that after controlling for potential confounders, providers in states with strong regulations have a lower probability of reporting POAs than providers in states with little or no regulation.
The standard OLS estimator makes the assumption that all errors in the P OA model are homoscedastic and independent. However, this is unlikely to be the case as hospital stays served by the same provider may have correlated heteroscedastic errors due to unobserved provider-specific variables. To account for this, we cluster our data at the provider (i.e., hospital) level, and use
cluster-robust standard errors that relax our assumptions to allow both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-provider correlation. (In §5.5, we perform a robustness check with coarser state-level clustering and confirm that our results remain statistically significant.)
The regression results with cluster-robust standard errors are shown in Table 5 . We find that, after controlling for patient risk through claims histories and demographic factors, strong state regulation is associated with significantly lower POA reporting rates (p = 1.0×10 −4 ). The coefficient of strong state regulation is −1.21 × 10 −3 ; performing counterfactuals yields that a provider in a weakly-regulated state is 16.7% more likely (compared to strongly-regulated providers) to claim a POA infection on an inpatient stay after risk-adjustment. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 Table 5 Results of regressions. Point estimates and cluster-robust standard errors (SE) of coefficients for (1) OLS regression of POA reports and (2) 2-SLS regression of HAI reports against strength of state reporting system and controls (many controls omitted due to space constraints; see Table 16 in Appendix F for full table).
HAI Regression
Let I i denote the vector of instrumental variables for inpatient stay i. We use standard two-stage least squares (2-SLS) for estimation (implemented in the ivreg2 Stata package). In the first stage, we fit our endogenous variable
In the second stage, we fit our outcome variable using the predictedŜ i from the first stage is positive, then after controlling for potential confounding variables and the endogeneity of regulation, providers in strongly-regulated states have a higher probability of reporting HAIs than providers in weakly-regulated states.
Once again, we use cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the provider level. We also perform weak-and over-identification tests to support the validity of our chosen instruments.
The regression coefficients, and robust standard errors clustered by provider are shown in Table 5 .
We find that, after controlling for patient risk through claims histories and demographic factors, strong state regulation is associated with significantly higher HAI reporting rates (p = 1.6 × 10 −2 ).
The coefficient of strong state regulation is 5.23 × 10 −4 ; performing counterfactuals yields that a provider in a weakly-regulated state is 42.6% less likely (compared to strongly-regulated providers)
to claim a HAI on an inpatient stay after risk-adjustment.
Tests of Instrument Validity. Our first-stage regression produced R 2 = 0.54, and the instruments (economic freedom indices) alone had a partial R 2 = 0.17 (see results in Appendix C.1).
We performed the standard IV validity tests under robust provider-level clustering. First, we performed a weak identification test, yielding a Kleinberg-Paap Wald F -statistic of 138. This is well above the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for the maximal IV relative bias (13.91 at the 5% level) and for the maximal IV size (22.30 at the 10% level), indicating that our instruments are not weak (Baum 2007) . Second, we performed an overidentification test, yielding a Hansen J statistic of 0.228 with a χ 2 p-value 0.89. Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis that our model is correctly specified, suggesting that our instruments are valid, i.e., economic freedom indices are uncorrelated with HAI reporting rates except through the treatment variable and controls. Third, we checked for endogeneity of the treatment variable, and found evidence (p = 0.03) rejecting the null hypothesis that the treatment variable is exogenous with respect to HAI reporting outcomes.
This result justifies our instrumental variable approach.
Loss Estimates
In order to estimate the annual number of upcoded infections as well as their associated costs to Medicare, we assume that the patient risk adjustment in our empirical analysis is unbiased. is larger than what we estimate. Secondly, it is unlikely that providers in strongly-regulated states have zero upcoding; in this case, the overall amount of upcoding is again larger than our estimate.
Furthermore, we do not consider losses through under-reporting HAIs in this analysis, since the cost of under-reporting is indirect and therefore harder to measure.
Note that our estimates from §5 sought only to establish the presence of upcoding, and therefore we combined the two kinds of infections (CLABSIs and CAUTIs) to increase the statistical power of our analysis. However, it is now important to distinguish these infections for calculating loss estimates since they have significantly different costs (as we note below). Thus, we perform two separate linear regressions on CLABSI-POA and CAUTI-POA outcomes respectively. We find the absolute value of the treatment effects, i.e., excess POA reporting rates, of:
• CLABSI-POA: 2.26 × 10 −4 with standard error 1.08 × 10 −4
• CAUTI-POA: 1.34 × 10 −3 with standard error 2.50 × 10 −4
Our data comprises 690,743 inpatient stays in weakly-regulated states over 2 years. Since we have a random 5% sample of all Medicare inpatient stays, we estimate that there are 6,907,430 Medicare inpatient stays per year in weakly-regulated states that meet our criteria. We compute the number of over-reported POAs for each infection (see Table 6 ) as:
[# patients in weakly-regulated states per year] × [excess POA rate]
We also obtain estimates of Medicare's added reimbursement cost for these infections from Umscheid (2011) . They find that CLABSIs result in a mean estimated incremental cost of $110,800 (95% CI: $22,700 -$327,000), and CAUTIs result in a mean estimated incremental cost of $2950 (95% CI: $1200 -$4700). We use these inputs to estimate the cost burden to Medicare from upcoding (see Table 6 ). 
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account for direct healthcare costs, and do not include broader societal costs, e.g., long-term impact of HAIs on patient health, and loss of patient productivity due to the extended hospital stay.
Policy Comparison
We defined our original treatment variable using three reporting requirements that we considered informative. We now alter the definition of the treatment variable based on reporting requirements along three dimensions: patient, event, and cause (see Table 9 in Appendix A). Thus, we demonstrate that our results are robust to the choice of treatment variable as long as it captures the stringency of regulations on truthful reporting. Moreover, we draw inferences about which types of reporting requirements may be effective at reducing upcoding rates for policy recommendations.
Alternative Definitions of Treatment Variable. We construct alternative definitions of the treatment variable through the following procedure. For every combination of patient/event/cause, we consider the relevant set of reporting requirements and compute the median number implemented by states with adverse event reporting systems (see Appendix D and Table 14 for details).
We define all states with more than the median number of requirements as "strongly regulated."
We also investigate an alternative definition where a strongly-regulated state is one that simply has an adverse event reporting system. These states are CA, CO, CT, DC, FL, GA, IN, KS, ME, MD, MA, MN, NJ, NV, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, WA, and WY.
For each of these definitions of the treatment variable, we ran a linear regression and a 2-SLS regression for POA and HAI outcomes respectively, as described in Sections 4.1-4.2. We show the estimated treatment effect along with the 95% confidence band (computed using cluster-robust standard errors) in Figure 2 . The "Original" definition refers to the measure that was defined and used earlier in the paper.
Results & Observations. First, we find that our results are largely consistent for different definitions of strong regulation that capture the magnitude of the providers' reporting burden in that state. In particular, stringent regulation on adverse event reporting is associated with reduced upcoding levels. On the other hand, merely having regulations for adverse event reporting is not associated with significant changes in upcoding rates. These findings support the hypothesis that laws cannot create proper incentives without sufficient accountability.
Second, we make some observations about the types of regulation where we are able to detect statistically significant reductions in upcoding, i.e., regulation results in statistically significant changes in both POA and HAI reporting rates 4 . We find that reporting patient information appears most valuable, while only reporting information on the event has limited value. This may be because
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. reporting patient information (such as the medical record number) may allow state entities to more easily audit hospital records. Our findings also suggest that reporting along all three dimensions is best; in particular, reporting patient, event, and cause information was associated with the highest reduction in upcoding. We emphasize that these are merely suggestive observations from the data; a more careful and rigorous analysis is required to definitively conclude which types of policies work best for reducing upcoding.
Alternative Regression Specifications
In addition to checking the robustness of our results to different definitions of the treatment variable ( §5.4), we also ensure that our results are consistent under alternative regression specifications:
1. Since the outcomes are binary, we use a probit model specification rather than a linear model.
2. We use a continuous (rather than binary) definition of the treatment variable, i.e., the number of total reporting requirements (out of 14) adopted by each state (see Fig 3 in Appendix A).
3. We use a two-level definition of the treatment variable, i.e., S = {0, 1, 2} corresponds to no adverse event reporting regulation, weak regulation, and strong regulation respectively.
4. We employ coarser state-level (rather than provider-level) clustering of standard errors.
Coarser clustering is believed to yield more conservative estimates (Cameron and Miller 2015) .
However, since there are only 50 states and we have over 70 controls, we exclude the Elixhauser and diagnosis controls to ensure that the estimation is not rank deficient.
We redo our POA and HAI analyses under each of these alternative specifications. Again, we find that our results are consistent (see Table 7 ). For instance, the marginal treatment effects of adding strong state regulation to weakly-regulated states for POAs are: −1.21 × 10 −3 (original binary treatment), −1.23 × 10 −3 (probit model), −0.87 × 10 −3 (continuous treatment), −1.14 × 10 −3
(two-level treatment), and −1.66 × 10 −3 (state-level clustering). These results are quite similar, suggesting that our loss estimates from §5.3 are robust to our model specification.
Discussion & Concluding Remarks
In summary, our results show that providers in states with stronger regulations on adverse event reporting have (1) lower (risk-adjusted) POA reporting rates and (2) higher (risk-adjusted) HAI 0.02 Table 7 Point estimates and cluster-robust standard errors for the coefficient of the treatment variable are shown for alternative specifications of the POA and HAI regressions.
reporting rates for CLABSIs and CAUTIs. This effect is statistically significant even after controlling for a wide range of patient risk factors and demographic characteristics, as well as arbitrary intra-provider correlations and endogeneity of regulation for HAI outcomes. The differential impact of state-level regulation on HAI and POA reporting rates strongly suggests that weakly-regulated providers upcode. If we further assume that the bias from unobservable patient risk confounders in our analysis is negligible, we can make the stronger claim that weakly-regulated providers are over-reporting POAs; in particular, we conservatively estimate that over 10,000 POA infections are over-reported annually, i.e., 18.5% of POAs reported by weakly-regulated states are actually HAIs.
This result is similar to that reported by Meddings et al. (2010) ; they find that out of 80 manually reviewed CAUTI medical records, 18 cases (22.5%) were over-reported as POAs. We estimate that the resulting reimbursement burden for Medicare is approximately $200 million a year.
A limitation of our methodology is that we cannot answer the converse question: what is the benefit of state adverse event reporting regulation in reducing upcoding? We note that strongly regulated states may have already had higher quality providers prior to the state-level regulations (see Appendix C.2). While this can only bias our estimates of upcoding in a conservative direction (see Appendix C.3), we are likely to over-estimate the benefit of strong state regulation.
Why does upcoding occur?
So far, we have focused on detecting whether upcoding happens, and have ignored the question of why and how it may occur. While a rigorous understanding is beyond the scope of this paper, we gained some insight based on discussions with 17 hospital staff that are part of a quality reporting team at Stanford hospital. This team, which consists primarily of nurses, is tasked with catching potential coder errors and relaying the information to compliance teams. They described some difficulties that make coding a particularly error-prone process:
1. Coders do not have the medical training to interpret medical records. Rather, they rely on doctor's notes, which are often sparse and incomplete. This claim is supported by the discussion in Meddings et al. (2010) based on their conversations with hospital coders:
"In discussion with hospital coders, we learned that hospital coders are instructed to obtain diagnosis information for payment purposes only from provider notes and not from nursing Author: Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs
28
notes. If a hospital coder does review nursing notes and suspects a diagnosis that is not apparent from provider notes, the hospital coder must then verify the diagnosis with a provider, and the provider would need to change the provider documentation to reflect this additional diagnosis.
However, reviewing nursing notes for potential diagnoses that then necessitate communication and additional documentation from a provider is a resource-intensive step."
2. Exacerbating the previous issue, the definitions used for differentiating and reporting HAIs and POAs vary by organization. For example, the same hospital must report the occurrence of each HAI to Medicare, the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), and other patient safety organizations (e.g., state adverse event reporting system); each of these organizations may have different definitions for HAIs vs. POAs, making accurate reporting both onerous and confusing.
3. In some cases, doctors skip or delay the step of performing (blood or urine) cultures (which are required to definitively claim that a patient has an infection), and simply place patients on
antibiotics. This may result in failure to attribute these infections correctly (with respect to claims reporting) even if the infection has been treated appropriately. In such cases, doctors may feel that they are unfairly blamed under the HAI legislation. Prior medical literature has argued that such policies may lead providers to "game" the system (e.g., upcode) if they feel that the penalties are unfair (Morreim 1991 , Werner et al. 2002 .
The hospital we visited has invested significantly in improving coding accuracy by hiring a large quality reporting team. They address these issues by double-checking coder reports and encouraging doctors to always perform cultures when a new patient is admitted. However, they pointed out that in general, there is little financial incentive for hospitals to make such investments. For example, hiring and training an employee to oversee quality can cost significantly more per year than paying a HAI penalty. Consequently, investment in coding quality may vary greatly across hospitals.
In hospitals without substantial investment in quality, coders have to make decisions based on very sparse evidence. In principle, according to the regulation, coders should conservatively report unclear cases as HAIs. However, due to the combination of financial and reputation penalties, coders may face pressure from hospital administration to upcode claims when the data is uncertain.
This problem is exacerbated by the prevalent use of software that "optimizes claims" for the highest possible reimbursement; such tools often auto-fill claims reports with higher-paying diagnoses (which the coder may then revise). This may enable upcoding in the presence of uncertainty since the coder may simply choose not to revise the default (higher-paying) option.
Harmful Effects of Upcoding
Our work suggests that financial incentives alone may not be the most effective way to reduce HAI incidence; these policies may benefit by accompanying regulation to enforce truthful reporting.
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Recent evidence suggests that the nonpayment policy has not reduced HAI rates (Lee 2012) , and
Medicare has responded by increasing financial incentives (e.g. HAC Reduction Program) and reputation incentives (e.g. published infection rates on Hospital Compare). While these measures might better incentivize hospitals to reduce HAI rates, they might also incentivize hospitals to increase upcoding rates. Increased upcoding would have a number of negative consequences. First, truthful providers are unfairly penalized and face greater financial pressure to upcode as well.
Second, upcoding biases medical records resulting in a loss of accurate information. This interferes with tracking harmful infections and evaluating the effectiveness of policies aimed at improving quality (Saint 2009 ). Third, publishing biased quality metrics may harm patients by routing them to providers who are engaging in upcoding rather than providing better quality of care. Thus, we recommend that CMS implement measures to enforce truthful reporting by providers.
Policy Recommendations
To this end, our results suggest two policy recommendations to help mitigate upcoding. First, we suggest that CMS perform targeted audits of providers with high (risk-adjusted) POA-to-HAI reporting ratios. As discussed in §2, providers with higher risk-adjusted POA reporting rates and lower risk-adjusted HAI reporting rates are more likely to be engaging in HAI upcoding. This approach can complement existing audits conducted by Medicare. In general, targeted auditing has been a profitable strategy for the government: the OIG finds that recently, for every $1 spent on health care fraud control, the federal government has returned $6.80 (Taebel 2012) . Second, we recommend that the federal government implement certain features of current state-level regulations that seem to be effective at eliciting truthful reporting. Our analysis establishes the effect of stronger regulation on decreased upcoding, and helps isolate some of the state adverse event reporting system features that were successful in reducing upcoding. These include reporting patient-identifying information (medical record number or billing number), a detailed description of the adverse event,
as well as the identified root cause of the adverse event. On the other hand, we note that simply having a reporting system without stringent requirements produced no significant effect on reporting rates; we find that it is crucial that the regulation creates sufficient provider accountability.
We hypothesize that simply requiring providers to report detailed information on how and why an adverse event occurred forces providers to implement the necessary infrastructure for detecting and preventing HAIs. Moreover, reporting more detailed information increases the threat of setting off red flags when upcoding, and thus possibly diminishes the rate of upcoding. CMS may benefit by implementing such detailed information reporting requirements in addition to existing financial incentives to help improve hospital infrastructure and truthful reporting nationally.
More broadly, we emphasize the importance of taking measures to mitigate upcoding as Medicare moves towards adopting a growing number of data-driven pay-for-performance policies (HHS 2015) .
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To support these efforts, we recommend that Medicare choose performance criteria that are not only representative of patient outcomes but are also easily and cheaply verifiable. Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. Levinson (2008) describes key features of the state reporting systems, including the type of information that must be reported by each state regarding (1) the affected patient, (2) the adverse event, and (3) the root cause of the adverse event. All 26 states with reporting systems enforced at least reporting the identity of the hospital and the adverse event that had occurred. We reproduce the information reported in each category and the number of states that had implemented each requirement in Table 9 . Table 9 Different types of information reporting requirements used in state adverse event reporting systems and the number of states that had implemented each requirement. Reproduced from Levinson (2008) .
Category
The heat map below (Fig. 3) illustrates the strength of adverse event reporting regulation in 2008 across the continental United States using data from Levinson (2008) .
Figure 3
Heat map depicting the number of reporting requirements implemented by each state's adverse event reporting system (before 2008) across the continental US using data from Levinson (2008) .
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B. Data Sample Selection
The data sample construction for our regression analyses is detailed in Table 10 . We are interested in data from 2009-10, since the claims data only begins to distinguish between POAs and HAIs after the policy was implemented in late 2008. We also restrict our sample to US providers under the prospective payment system since billing procedures may vary otherwise. Similarly, we restrict our sample to "short stays" (as defined in the claims data) since providers who treat "long stay" patients are typically not hospitals and are subject to different billing procedures as well. Another concern is that if a patient is newly enrolled in
Medicare (e.g., switched from Medicare Advantage), their past visits may be censored (thus, creating bias in controls computed on past visits); we address this by restricting our sample to stays where the patient had at least one prior visit in the last 2 years (which ensures that they were recently enrolled in Medicare). We choose a two-year window because it is the longest possible window in our dataset for patients in our sample . Finally, we restrict our sample to those patient and providers for whom we have demographic controls (from zipcode-level census data) and provider-level controls (from Hospital Compare data). Table 10 Data sample construction for regression analyses.
C. Instrumental Variable Analysis C.1. First-Stage Regression
The results of the first-stage regression are show in Table 11 . The total R 2 = 0.54, and the instruments (economic freedom indices) alone had a partial R 2 = 0.17. This produced a first-stage F -statistic of 128.12 with a corresponding p-value of 0, indicating that our chosen instruments are not weak.
We note that although the Area 3 economic freedom index has a negative pairwise correlation with the treatment variable, the regression coefficient of this instrument in the first-stage regression is positive. This is because our three instruments are correlated, i.e., the area 3 EFI is positively correlated with the treatment variable after conditioning on the other two economic freedom indices. However, the IV estimator does not require the instruments to be uncorrelated with each other, so this does not affect the correctness of our econometric analysis. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 Table 11 Results of first-stage regression for instrumental variable analysis. Point estimates and cluster-robust standard errors (SE) of coefficients for regression of treatment variable S against economic freedom indices (coefficients of some patient risk variables omitted due to space constraints).
C.2. Quality Comparison
Since, we are using the instrumented regulation variable rather than the true regulation variable in our HAI regression, we repeat our robustness checks to ensure that provider-level quality metrics are positively correlated with the instrumented regulation variable. First, we compare risk-adjusted mortality rates against each of the three instruments and the instrumented strong regulation variable (see Table 12 ). Using a Pearson correlation test, we find similar results:
1. mortality rates are negatively correlated with the Area 1 economic freedom index (which is positively correlated with strong regulation), 2. mortality rates are positively correlated with the Area 2 and 3 economic freedom indices (which are negatively correlated with strong regulation), and 3. mortality rates are negatively correlated with the instrumented strong regulation variable. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 Table 12 Pearson correlation test results are shown for Medicare providers' risk-adjusted mortality rates and our three instruments (economic freedom indices) as well as the instrumented treatment variable for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia patients. Table 13 Pearson correlation test results are shown comparing Medicare's risk-adjusted process of care quality measures and the instrumented propensity to be a strongly-regulated state for heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical care improvement.
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Second, we compare all reported (risk-adjusted) process of care quality measures against the instrumented strong regulation variable (see Table 13 ). Similar to our earlier findings for the un-instrumented regulation variable, we find that the instrumented regulation variable is correlated with higher quality in all but two measures (the negative correlation is not statistically significant for both measures), and the improvement in performance is statistically significant for 75% of the measures.
C.3. Conservative Estimates
In this section, we argue that if our instrument is negatively correlated with the error term and positively correlated with our treatment variable, then our treatment effect estimate will be conservative. Since the Area 2 and 3 indices are negatively correlated with the treatment variable, we will consider the negative of these two indices to be the instruments under consideration. Recall that the error term in HAI reporting rates is poor (unobserved) HAI-specific provider quality (since this is positively correlated with the outcome variable of HAI reporting rates). As shown in the previous section (Appendix C.2), we expect our instruments (with sign defined as above) to be negatively correlated with this error term (poor provider quality).
For simplicity, consider a simple one-dimensional model with a single instrument (the argument easily generalizes to higher dimensions). We have:
where y i is the dependent variable, x i is an independent variable, i is an unobserved error term, and β is a scalar coefficient that we seek to estimate. If x and are correlated, we use an instrument z. This gives us the IV estimatorβ
Clearly, if z is uncorrelated with , then the IV estimate is a consistent estimator of β (Wooldridge 2010).
We consider the case where z may be negatively correlated with , i.e., the second term
(Recall that we defined the instruments so that they are positively correlated with the treatment variable, i.e., z T x > 0.) Then, it follows thatβ IV < β. Thus, ifβ IV > 0 (as we find in the HAI regression), then the true estimate also satisfies β > 0.
D. Robustness Checks
We now describe the construction of alternative treatment definitions (used for robustness checks in §5.4). For every combination of patient/event/cause reporting categories, we first consider the relevant set of reporting requirements (see Table 14 below). We then compute the median number implemented by the states with adverse event reporting systems, and define all states with more than the median number of requirements as "strongly regulated."
Author: Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. Table 14 Different definitions of the treatment variable based on the number of reporting requirements along three dimensions (patient, event, and cause), as well as the number of states that satisfied this infection.
E. Outpatient Services
One concern with our analysis may arise from variations in outpatient service quality. In particular, patients may acquire one of the targeted infections at an outpatient facility, and their subsequent admission to an inpatient provider may cause increased POA rates. (Note that this issue should not affect HAI rates since these infections occur at the inpatient facility and our instrumental variable approach accounts for possible variations in inpatient provider quality.) Table 15 compares outpatient process of care measures using the December 2015 release of Hospital Compare's risk-adjusted provider quality metrics; we note that these metrics were not made available in Hospital Compare data during the study period (2009-10). The numbers suggest that outpatient quality metrics are also improved in strongly-regulated states, which is consistent with our claim that quality of care is higher in strongly-regulated states.
Thus, we may be concerned that high infection incidence in weakly-regulated outpatient facilities may explain relatively high POA reporting rates upon subsequent transfer to an inpatient facility. To address this concern, we conducted a POA regression that omits patients who have recently received any outpatient services 5 . We find that the coefficient of strong state regulation is −1.16 × 10 −3 with a corresponding p-value of 0.001. This estimate is very similar to our previous estimate from §5 where we did not omit transferred patients. Thus, we believe that our results are not merely due to variations in outpatient quality.
F. Full Regression Results
The regression table in the body of the paper (Table 5 ) omits many controls due to space constraints. Table   16 shows the full regression table with most of the omitted controls (except 29 Elixhauser scores, which we again omit due to space constraints). Table 15 T-test results are shown comparing Medicare's risk-adjusted process of care quality measures in strongly vs. weakly regulated states for heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical care improvement.
Author: Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 Table 16 Results of regressions. Point estimates and cluster-robust standard errors (SE) of coefficients for (1) OLS regression of POA reports and (2) 2-SLS regression of HAI reports against strength of state reporting system and controls (Elixhauser coefficients omitted due to space constraints).
